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Abstract Michelle Moody-Adams suggests that Bthe main obstacle to moral progress in
social practices is the tendency to widespread affected ignorance of what can and should
already be known.^ This explanation is promising, though to understand it we need to know
what willful (affected, motivated, strategic) ignorance actually is. This paper presents a novel
analysis of this concept, which builds upon Moody-Adams (1994) and is contrasted with a
recent account by Lynch (2016).
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1 Introduction
According to the Global Slavery Index, there is more slavery today than ever before. This
raises the question: why do so many people still work in slavery or slavery-like conditions?
One straightforward explanation would be that we just cannot do any better. A more interesting
explanation has been offered by Michelle Moody-Adams:
The main obstacle to moral progress in social practices is the tendency to widespread
affected ignorance of what can and should already be known. (1999: 180)
The idea is not that we cannot do better, but that we do not want to know that we
can, and indeed should, do better. Consider the slaveholder in ancient times. As one
may imagine her, she was ignorant that keeping slaves is wrong. According to
Moody-Adams, the slaveholder should and could have known better, and she’s
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keeping slaves, and obstructing moral progress, only because her ignorance is affected
or willful.1 This explanation is promising, but to understand it, we need to know what
willful ignorance actually is.2 It seems to me that we do not have a clear grasp of this
complex notion.
In a nutshell, willful ignorance can be seen as ignorance that is due to one’s own
will rather than to external barriers. You are ignorant not because it’s excessively
difficult to know better, but because you do not want to know better even though it’s
relatively easy to do so. In terms of necessary and sufficient conditions3: S’s igno-
rance of p is willful iff S could figure out that p is true if she would try to do so, but
S does not do it because she does not want to do it. On a general level, this simple
account seems right. However, it is not very illuminating. Is this what obstructs moral
progress? Surely you could have known about the weather conditions in Amsterdam
at this very moment, and presumably you do not want to know this because you
simply do not care. Nothing in that obstructs moral progress.
In contrast, interesting cases of willful ignorance are puzzling. They are cases
where an agent, on the one hand, chooses to sustain her ignorance because this is
somehow convenient for her, while, on the other hand, she may well be ignorant that
she is doing this. The ancient slaveholder, for example, seems to sustain her ignorance
in this way. But how can one choose to remain ignorant about certain inconvenient
truths, yet remain ignorant in a relevant sense? In this paper, I’ll discuss the details of
this.
Here’s the plan. In §2, I’ll discuss Moody-Adams’ suggestions on the issue. In §3,
building on Moody-Adams’ cases, I propose a specific account of willful ignorance.
This account is largely intensional in the sense that it purports to define the meaning
of ‘willful ignorance’, and to a lesser extent extensional and concerned with delin-
eating the class of items that actually fall under the concept. In §4, I’ll spell out two
cases in some detail: the ancient slaveholder and the contemporary consumer. In §5,
I’ll raise a puzzle about willful ignorance and contrast my account with a recent
proposal by Lynch (2016). Finally, in §6, I’ll conclude and return to the question: in
what sense does willful ignorance form an obstacle to moral progress?
One caveat. It’s important to note that Moody-Adams’ claim just mentioned is controver-
sial. That is, not everyone accepts that willful ignorance is the main obstacle to moral progress.
In the following, I will not provide direct support for this claim (or against it for that matter).
Rather, the paper’s main contribution is to provide a novel analysis of willful ignorance (which
may be accepted by both Moody-Adams and her opponents).
2 Moody-Adams
In the following, I consider Moody-Adams’ rich (1994) paper on this issue, and propose an
account of willful ignorance on its basis. Moody-Adams argues against the following claims:
1 I’ll treat willful, affected, motivated, and strategic ignorance as the same (even though they might have different
connotations), and use the term ‘willful’ throughout the paper. The concept has a long history, stretching back at
least to Aquinas (Summa Theologiae, I-II, Q.6, art. 8).
2 There are more reasons why studying this concept is important. For its role in legal contexts, cf. Husak and
Callender (1994); Sarch (2014).
3 In the paper, ‘S′ stands for an agent, ‘p’ for a proposition, and, later on, ‘A’ for an action or omission.
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(1) In certain cases, S’s upbringing in a culture can render one unable to know that certain
actions are wrong.
(2) In such cases, S is blameless for those actions.
(3) Whether (1) applies in a certain case is an empirical matter.
(4) For example, the ancient slaveholder was unable to know that slavery is wrong (and, per
(2), she’s blameless for keeping slaves).
As to (4), how can we determine whether the slaveholder could or could not have
known that slavery is wrong? As Moody-Adams (1994: 294) rightly points out, one
cannot simply consider evidence about what agents did and did not do at that time.
After all, the fact that many people did not question slavery does not mean that they
could not have done this. At any rate, Moody-Adams thinks the main problem has to
do with (1). In her view, no culture can render one unable to know that certain
actions are wrong. She writes:
every human being has the capacity to imagine (to conceive) that her social world might
be organized on quite different principles … one has the capacity to question existing
social practices merely by virtue of learning to form the negation of any statement.
(1994: 296)
For example, the slaveholder could have imagined a world without slaves, and thus figured
out that slavery is wrong. And what applies to slavery, applies to any wrongful practice: you’ll
be able to question it, and figure out that it’s wrong. If this is so, (1) is false. No culture full of
people who do not question slavery will take away your own capacity to question slavery. This
also implies that it’s not an empirical issue whether or not you are able to see that slavery is
wrong (which refutes (3)). You possess this capacity, no matter the circumstances in which you
might find yourself.
Let me add two qualifications. First, there is a distinction between moral and
factual ignorance. The slaveholder might be factually ignorant that she keeps slaves.
Suppose that, unbeknownst to her, she inherited a plantation abroad where workers
are forced to work without pay. The slaveholder might also be morally ignorant that
keeping slaves is wrong, even if she does know all the relevant facts (that she keeps
slaves, that they suffer, that they are persons similar to herself, that they are unfree
and lack any rights, etc.). This distinction matters. We cannot overcome all factual
ignorance, that is, on the basis of our imagination. But perhaps we can overcome all
moral ignorance in this way (at least in the cases I will be considering) as long as we
know, or could know, all the relevant non-moral facts. The slaveholder could have
figured out that her family’s business is wrong so long as she knew, or could have
known, that it involves slavery.
Second, in principle there’s a distinction between the capacity to question slavery
(or any practice) and the capacity to know that slavery is indeed wrong. After all,
considering a question is not the same as finding the right answer. Relatedly, if
proponents of (1) claim that one might have been unable to know that slavery is
wrong, they do not seem to deny that one can form and understand the sentence
‘slavery is wrong’, but merely hold that one had no access to a good reason to think
this. As Levy writes: BNo doubt it is true that Greeks could form sentences like ‘A
world without slavery is possible.’ But bare ability to imagine a possibility, in this
sense, is very far from constituting a reason to take the proposal seriously.^ (2003:
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157) So to deny (1) in a relevant sense, we also have to assume that, no matter the
culture you live in, you have access to a good reason to see that slavery is wrong.4
If we reject (1), (3) and (4), then (2) may fail as well. At least, S is not to be excused on the
basis of her culture. It might still be that S has other excuses. After all, being able to see that A
is wrong should only be considered a necessary condition for blameworthiness for A, not a
sufficient one.5 I’ll have to leave (2) and the blameworthiness issue aside in this paper.6 What I
will focus on is willful ignorance. If S were able to know that A is wrong (in the relevant
sense), then her ignorance has to be explained in another way. She could have known, but did
not want to. Here is what Moody-Adams says about willful ignorance:
Affected ignorance – choosing not to know what one can and should know – is a
complex phenomenon, but sometimes it simply involves refusing to consider whether
some practice in which one participates might be wrong. Sometimes – perhaps much of
the time – cultures are perpetuated by human beings who are uncritically committed to
the internal perspective on the way of life they hope to preserve. (1994: 296)
Listed as a set of conditions, the proposal seems to be this:
S’s ignorance of p is willful if
(i) p implies that A, an action of S, is wrong;
(ii) S should have considered p;
(iii) S could have considered p;
(iv) but S does not consider p;
(v) because S wants to keep on doing A.
This list constitutes a sufficient condition. If all clauses are fulfilled, S is willfully ignorant.
But I think it’s not the case that all willful ignorance entails all these clauses. Moody-Adams
herself is rather careful when it comes to (i), (iv) and (v), and I’d add that (ii) may not be
necessary either. As noted in the introduction, you may stay willfully ignorant of the weather in
Amsterdam, which does not entail (i) or (ii). For typically, weather conditions do not
undermine the permissibility of your behaviour, nor are you supposed to know about them.
Still, the proposal is supposed to capture a significant class of willful ignorance (including the
case of the ancient slaveholder).
Clause (v) appears crucial: S does not consider p, not for example because considering p is
boring or excessively difficult, but because S wants to keep on doing A. The ancient
slaveholder does not consider the suffering and rights of her slaves because she wants to keep
on exploiting them (more on this later). This ‘self-interest clause’ corresponds to Moody-
Adams’ claim that in many cases the willfully ignorant agent is, as she puts it in the citation
just given, one who is Buncritically committed to the internal perspective on the way of life
they hope to preserve^.7
4 That is, so long as it’s not unreasonably difficult to know all the relevant non-moral facts, as per the first
qualification. For further discussion, cf. Harman (2011); Wieland (2015).
5 These are fairly standard assumptions: S is blameworthy for wrongful A done from ignorance only if S is
blameworthy for her ignorance that A is wrong (among further necessary conditions, such as certain control or
freedom conditions), and S is blameworthy for the latter only if S could have known that A is wrong (presumably
among other necessary conditions).
6 This issue has received some attention in the literature, cf. Calhoun (1989); Isaacs (1997); Benson (2001); Levy
(2003); Scarre (2005); Pleasants (2008); Peacock (2011), among many others.
7 Similar suggestions can also be found elsewhere (e.g. Calhoun 1989: 399).
108 J.W. Wieland
3 My Account
To test whether (i)-(v) are adequate conditions, let us consider the four examples we find in
Moody-Adams (1994: 301). First, there is the torturer who uses specific language that masks
her violent methods (such as calling one of them Bthe parrot’s swing^), and remains willfully
ignorant of the fact that BI am inflicting serious suffering.^ Second, there is the head of an
investment bank who insists on not knowing how profit is made, and remains willfully
ignorant of the fact that Billicit methods are being used to gain profit^. Third, there is the
mother who does not ask how her son can afford to give her expensive gifts, and remains
willfully ignorant of the fact that Bmy son is a drug dealer.^ Finally, there is the university
administrator who refuses to investigate a harassment allegation, and remains willfully igno-
rant of the fact that Ba colleague is guilty of harassment.^8
These are four different kinds of cases. The torturer masks her wrongful behaviour. The
banker refuses certain information about wrongful behaviour. The mother does not ask
questions about wrongful behaviour. And the university administrator denies wrongful behav-
iour. Are these all cases of willful ignorance under (i)-(v)? Let us consider these clauses in turn.
Clause (i), or at least a close variant, is fulfilled in all of these cases. That one is inflicting
serious suffering is wrong. That illicit methods are being used to gain profit is wrong. That
one’s son is dealing drugs is wrong. That there is harassment in one’s school is wrong. In all
these cases, there is some proposition which implies that a certain behaviour is wrong. But it is
not always the agent’s own behaviour. It might also be the behaviour of someone else (one’s
bank, one’s son, or the people in one’s school). To be sure, in these cases the agent seems still
to be complicit in wrongdoing. It is not only wrong that one’s son is dealing drugs, but also
that one accepts his expensive gifts. It is not only wrong that there is harassment in one’s
school, but also that one fails to do something about it. Still, it would not be fully adequate to
say that when S is willfully ignorant of p, p merely indicates that S’s conduct is wrong (and not
conduct of others), and this qualification has to be added to (i).
Before arguing that (v) calls for a more substantive revision, let me briefly show why
(ii)-(iv) are fulfilled in all cases. As to (ii), in all cases the agent should know better.9 The
torturer should know that her methods are violent, because knowing this will enable her to see
that she should change her behaviour. The same applies in the other cases: the banker should
know that the firm uses illicit methods, the mother should know that her son is a drug dealer,
and the administrator should know about the harassment – this all because the given practices
are wrong and knowing the relevant facts will enable them to see this (and to see, further, that
they should change, or help change, those practices). As to (iii), in all cases the agent could
know better. The torturer could see that she should not torture, the banker could find out how
her bank makes profit, the mother could ask her son how it is possible that she gets so many
gifts, and the administrator could investigate the harassment. In all of these cases, it’s not
unreasonably difficult to know better, and yet the agents in question do not do it, as per (iv).
8 My discussion of the four cases may differ in some ways from how Moody-Adams presented them. For
example, in Moody-Adams (1994: 301) the agents willfully avoid information about whether a certain propo-
sition is true (irrespective of whether they are in fact true). For ease of discussion, I’ll assume that the given
propositions are true.
9 Moody-Adams does not further unpack clause (ii). For the purposes of this paper, I’ll assume that S should
know p if knowing p enables her to see certain duties she has (such as stopping her slave keeping practices). The
relationship between (ii) and (iii) is controversial, though given that (iii) is supposed to hold in most of the cases
discussed in this paper, it does not really matter whether (ii) implies (iii), or whether they are independent clauses.
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At first sight, clause (v) appears promising. One is willfully ignorant whenever this in one’s
self-interest. Moreover, in the first two cases this seems to work. The torturer masks her
behaviour because she wants to torture (she wants to do this, for example, in order to obtain
certain information, or because she wants to follow orders10), and this is the most comfortable
way to do it. Similarly, the banker refuses to hear about the practices in her firm because she
wants to keep on making profit, and immoral ways might be the best ways to do it.11
However, this kind of motivation does not really seem to work in the other two cases. As
we might imagine the mother, it’s not the case that she does not ask questions about her son’s
behaviour because she wants to receive more gifts. Instead, she does not ask questions because
she loves her son, and knowing he’s dealing drugs is inconvenient. In this case, willful
ignorance is not based on self-interest, but rather on what might be called ‘other-interest’.
The fourth case, of the school administrator, is of yet a different kind. The administrator
does not deny the harassment because she wants it to continue in her school. Nor does she
deny it simply because she cares about the suspects or the victims. Rather, she denies it
because she (or her school) failed to prevent them, which affects the image that she and others
have of her (and her school).12 In this last case, willful ignorance is again based on self-
interest, but not on the forward-looking self-interest of the torturer and banker, but on what
might be called backward-looking self-interest. The latter is called ‘backward-looking’, be-
cause the agent wants to stay ignorant about past behaviour (rather than facilitate future
behaviour).
In principle, though, Moody-Adams’s four cases can be unpacked in different ways. For
example, in the mother case I think the other-interest reading is the most natural reading of the
case. But this is not to say that the forward-looking self-interest or backward-looking self-
interest readings are impossible. Indeed, it might still be the case that the mother enjoys the
expensive gifts (forward-looking self-interest), or that she feels responsible for the fact that her
son became a drug dealer (backward-looking self-interest). Similarly, in the school adminis-
trator case, it might still be the case that the administrator does not care so much about her self-
image (backward-looking self-interest), but that she wants to be loyal to a colleague, and wants
to believe the latter could not possibly be guilty (other-interest).
What do all these motivations for willful ignorance have in common? One might
think that in all cases the ignorance is useful for the agent. But that’s not exactly the
right way to put it. The ignorance may seem useful for the torturer and banker,
because it’s easier for them to act immorally if they are ignorant. But it does not
sound quite right to say that the ignorance is useful for the mother or the university
administrator. In fact, in a clear sense it benefits none of the agents. For their
ignorance prevents them from seeing that a certain behaviour is wrongful. Instead,
what all these cases seem to have in common is that the agent wants to remain
ignorant because it is convenient to do so, while knowledge of p is inconvenient. But
10 Had her motives been sadistic, i.e. had she enjoyed the torturing, then she did not really have a reason to mask
her conduct.
11 Cf. also the initial analysis of the influential experiment by Dana et al. (2007), discussed in Spiekermann
(2016). For the hypothesis that participants do not hide behind their ignorance in order to get off the hook for
choosing unfairly, but really think it’s permissible to act in certain ways without considering further information,
cf. Spiekermann and Weiss (2015).
12 For the relevance of self-image concerns in this context, cf. Dana et al. (2007); Bénabou and Tirole (2006);
Grossman and Van der Weele (2016).
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the reason why this is inconvenient may differ, as I just showed on the basis of
Moody-Adams’ four cases.
Taking these modifications of clauses (i) and (v) into account, we get the following
account of willful ignorance:
S’s ignorance of p is willful if
(i*) p implies that A, an action of S or another agent S*, is wrong;
(ii) S should have considered p;
(iii) S could have considered p;
(iv) but S does not consider p;
(v*) because this is inconvenient for S, e.g.
& [forward-looking self-interest] S wants to keep on doing A in the future, since A has
certain advantages for her over alternatives, or
& [backward-looking self-interest] S did not prevent S* or herself from doing A in the past,
and this affects the image that S and/or others have of S, or
& [other-interest] S cares about S*, and S does not want to know that S* commits
wrongful actions.
Perhaps the list of motivations under (v*) is not exhaustive, but many cases fall
under one (or several) of these three cases. In the remainder of this paper, I’ll apply
my account to two further cases, and discuss whether we need additional clauses (i.e.
certain symptoms, a cultural dimension, and a certain awareness). My conclusion will
be that we do not need further clauses, and that the account is adequate as it stands.
4 Applications
To illustrate my account in further detail, let us consider two cases: the notorious case
of the ancient slaveholder, and the case of contemporary consumers. In the following
I’ll treat these cases as willful ignorance cases, and assume that (i*)-(v*) are fulfilled
(even though it remains controversial whether (iii) is fulfilled, i.e. the clause accord-
ing to which S could have considered p in a relevant sense and have known better).
As to (i*), let us say the ancient slaveholder was ignorant of the proposition Bslaves
suffer and have the right to their own lives^ (or of any other proposition that implies that
slaveholding is wrong). As to (ii), the slaveholder should have considered this proposition,
because slaveholding is wrong, and considering it would have enabled her to see that her
slaves suffer (which would have helped her realize that she should change her practices).
As to (iii), she could have considered it: information that slaves suffer and have a right to
their own lives was right in front of her (though one might think that this information
was obscured by the culture in which she lived, and I’ll address this soon). As to (iv) and
(v*), she did not consider whether slaveholding is wrong because not knowing that
slaveholding is wrong was convenient for her. She might be motivated to remain ignorant
for two different reasons. First, she exploited people, and the information that she did so
affects the image she (and others) have of her (backward-looking self-interest). Second,
she wants to keep her workers, and exploiting them ignorantly is less inconvenient
(forward-looking self-interest).
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Very similar things apply contemporary consumers.13 As to (i*), many consumers
are ignorant of the proposition Bthis product I want to buy (T-shirt, smartphone,
coffee, etc.) is made in slavery-like working conditions^. As to (ii), they should have
considered this proposition, because buying such products is wrong (let us assume),
and considering it would have enabled them to see that they would do better to buy
an alternative product made in better working conditions. As to (iii), they could have
known better by checking the labels, by searching for online information, and
sometimes by asking questions at relevant places. As to (iv) and (v*), they do not
do this, because not knowing about working conditions is more convenient for them.
Again, they might be motivated to remain ignorant for two different reasons. First,
they may have bought many such products in the past and knowing that, in this, they
contributed to the exploitation of people affects the image they have of themselves
(backward-looking self-interest). Second, they may want to keep on buying cheap
products, and doing this in ignorance is more convenient (forward-looking self-
interest).
In both cases, my account works well to explain willful ignorance in these cases. But more
can be said, namely about certain symptoms that conjoin willful ignorance and about the
cultural or social dimension of these cases.14
It can be hard to detect willful ignorance. After all, people’s motivations are not always
transparent (and hence it’s not always clear whether and in what way clause (v*) is fulfilled).
Still, willful ignorance often manifests in certain symptoms, so we may detect the former on
the basis of the latter. Moody-Adams suggests two such symptoms, namely Bthe readiness of
some people to ask no questions about some state of affairs, in spite of evidence that an inquiry
may be needed in order to stop or prevent wrongdoing^ and Bthe tendency to avoid acknowl-
edging our human fallibility^ and Bto avoid or deny this possibility ,^ namely that Beven our
most deeply held convictions may be wrong^ (1994: 301).15
The list of symptoms is likely to be larger. There is not only indifference, not asking
questions about A’s permissibility despite the availability of answers, and arrogance, thinking
that one’s take on A’s permissibility is infallible in the face of its fallibility. There is also denial,
telling oneself that doing A is permissible in the face of A being wrong; trivialization, telling
oneself that A is morally unimportant in the face of A being morally important; and rational-
ization, making up non-sense reasons for A in the face of good reasons being available against
A.16 For example, slaveholders may well tell themselves that slaveholding is permissible, or
that the issue is unimportant, or that it is needed in order to realize other values such as
democracy (cf. Peacock 2011: 74–5). Similarly, consumers may well tell themselves that
13 Cf. also Ehrich and Irwin (2005); Peacock (2015). One difference might be that the ancient slaveholder was
morally ignorant, while consumers are only factually ignorant (see §2 for this distinction).
14 Also, something can be said about the doxastic attitude towards p (and towards the fact that they are avoiding
information about p) that agents have when they are willfully ignorant of p. I’ll address this in §5. For the
moment, let us just assume that slaveholders and consumers are unaware that they are avoiding information.
15 These symptoms might, though need not, go together with general vices or insensitivities. If one manifests
symptoms of willful ignorance, one fails to ask questions about a specific piece of behaviour A. If one manifests
general vices one fails to ask questions about many issues.
16 These are symptoms of self-deception, and so I disagree with Lynch (2016) that willful ignorance and self-
deception are quite different things. In my view, both willful ignorance and self-deception can be non-intentional,
the difference being that willful ignorance need not go together with symptoms of self-deception in all cases (as
I’ll explain below). The literature on self-deception is vast (for an overview of the controversy between
intentionalists and non-intentionalists, cf. Deweese-Boyd 2012). I’ll discuss the account of Lynch in due course.
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buying questionable products is permissible because it creates work (no matter in what
conditions).17
Even though these symptoms go very naturally with willful ignorance, they are not required
for the latter. For S may be willfully ignorant without telling herself that A is permissible, or
morally irrelevant, or that her belief that A is permissible is infallible, and without confabu-
lating reasons for A. All that is needed is that S not have a belief that A is wrong (I’ll qualify
this in §5). As to indifference, can S be willfully ignorant and still ask questions about the thing
she’s ignorant of? The answer is not clear. For one cannot ask questions and yet remain
ignorant, given that the answer is available to S (as per clause (iii)). Still, given that the
symptom of indifference is entailed by clause (iv) (i.e. that S does not consider the issue), it
need not be added as a separate condition to the account.
Willful ignorance might be culturally and socially embedded in two ways. First, the given
behaviour A, though morally wrong, is often legally permissible. S can get away with doing A,
so to speak. In certain ancient contexts, slavery was legally permissible. Moreover, slave-
holders had a whole battery of cultural traditions to sustain their outlook and keep it from
critical scrutiny. Similarly, buying products made in slavery-like working conditions is legally
permissible in most contemporary contexts (even though slavery itself is widely condemned).
Second, individuals are often not alone in their willful ignorance. Many peers perform A-like
actions, are similarly ignorant, and manifest the same symptoms. Many other people kept
slaves, and did not ask questions about the status of slaves in their society. Similarly, many
other consumers buy cheap products made in unacceptable conditions, and do not ask
questions about the cheap prices.
Again, such social embedding seems typical, but it’s not required for willful ignorance. For
example, it is absent in many of Moody-Adams’ cases. The banker is probably surrounded by
other willfully ignorant bankers, though the torturer, mother, and university administrator
might be willfully ignorant, even if no one else is.
A few final comments on difficulty and degrees. One may wonder whether S’s social
embedding can make it too difficult for her to see that A is wrong. As we saw, Moody-Adams
believes this to be a mistake.18 In cases of willful ignorance, S could figure out whether A is
wrong by consulting a certain source, and this is not unreasonably demanding for S, given that
the source is accessible to her and given that she does not have more important things to do.
Slaveholders can pay attention to their slaves, consumers can check relevant websites, and in
many cases they do not have more important things on their mind (that is, more important than
the exploitation of people).
Yet, difficulty comes in degrees. There’s a difference between the omission to call someone
to obtain information and the omission to pick up the phone when people are calling you with
that same kind of information. In this respect, the slaveholder and the consumer may differ. In
the case of the slaveholder, as we might imagine her, information is staring her in the face. It’s
very difficult not to see that her slaves suffer. Paying attention might suffice to show her that
slavery is wrong and that she should change her practices. In the case of the consumer, by
contrast, it’s easier not to see that the people in the supply chain suffer. After all, one is not
directly confronted with them, and one needs to exert more effort to inform oneself.
17 For such rationalizations (also called ‘neutralizations’), cf. Chatzidakis et al. (2007); Eckhardt et al. (2010);
Paharia et al. (2013); Gruber and Schlegelmilch (2014).
18 This is controversial: Guerrero (2007: 72) concurs, while Pleasants (2011: 150-1) disagrees.
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Given this, it’s plausible that willful ignorance comes in degrees as well. In fact, all of the
clauses I have discussed might be fulfilled to a greater or lesser extent. As to (i*), p might
strongly or only weakly support the proposition that A is wrong. As to (ii), A might be wrong
to a greater or lesser extent, and so more or less might depend on the fact that S informs herself
about p. As to (iii), as we just saw, information might be more or less accessible. As to (iv), S
might exert more or less effort to avoid relevant information. Moreover, there may well be a
certain proportional relationship between (iii) and (iv): the less effort is needed to access the
information, the more effort is needed to avoid it, and vice versa. As to (v*), knowledge that A
is wrong might be more or less inconvenient.19
5 A Puzzle
Suppose S satisfies all clauses (i*)-(v*), but is unaware that she does. Is she still willfully
ignorant? Consider clauses (iv) and (v*) in particular. Together, they state that S does not
consider p because this is inconvenient for S. Importantly, for S to satisfy these clauses, is it
not enough that S does not consider p and that considering p is inconvenient for S. For some
sort of connection need to obtain between these clauses, namely there has to be a causal
relationship between the fact that considering p is inconvenient for S and the fact of her
omission to consider p.20 The question in the following will be whether we need more than
this. Particularly, does the agent need to be aware of this connection, i.e. of the fact she does
not consider p because this is inconvenient for her? In my view, the answer here is negative.
But in order to show this, I need to tackle the following puzzle:
Horn (A) On the one hand, if S is fully unaware that she is avoiding information, then it is
unclear that S is willfully avoiding information. This raises a paradox: how can S uncon-
sciously choose not to know some inconvenient truth? For if S does so, it seems she is not
really choosing not to consider whether A is wrong.
Horn (B) On the other hand, if S is aware that she is avoiding information about A, then it’s
not clear that S is really ignorant. At least S seems to know that there’s a serious risk that A is
wrong. This raises a paradox: how can S consciously choose not to know some inconvenient
truth? For if S does so, it seems she is not really ignorant, but rather suspects its truth. This
puzzle has recently been taken up by Lynch (2016: 509), who favours a solution
along the following lines (which is in large part inspired by Husak and Callender
1994). According to Lynch, willful ignorance about p entails a suspicion that p is
true. This suspicion covers a subtle attitudinal space. First, this attitude is weaker than
a belief that p is true. For if you believe that p is true, you are not ignorant that p is
true. Second, the attitude is incompatible with a belief that p is false. For if you
believe that p is false, you do not have a suspicion that p is true. Third, the attitude is
incompatible with the absence of such a suspicion. For if you do not even have a
19 For experimental studies on some of these gradual phenomena, cf. Grossman (2014); Grossman and Van der
Weele (2016).
20 The causal relation has to be non-deviant, i.e. S’s omitting to consider p is a normal or typical upshot of the fact
that this is inconvenient for S.
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suspicion, your ignorance cannot be willful or intended. You’d just be ignorant, and
the fact that you are avoiding information would not be your choice.21
The four cases by Moody-Adams might indeed involve such a suspicion (cf. also Levy
2003: 154). The torturer may suspect that her methods are wrongfully violent (even though she
may tell herself that they are justifiably violent). The banker may suspect that her firm uses
illicit methods to gain profit. The mother may suspect that her son is a drug dealer. And the
university administrator may suspect harassment. This may not mean that they have a clear
attitude with a well-defined propositional content of the form ‘I could and should inform
myself about the given action A, but I am avoiding relevant information about A because this
is convenient for me’. But it does mean that they have a vague suspicion that p might be true
(and that A might be wrong).22
Suspicions come with a certain awareness. If you suspect that p is true, you are aware that p
might be true (that there’s a certain risk that p is true, so to speak). As just noted, the content of
suspicions can be more or less well-defined. The mother might only be aware of the fact that
something is wrong with the presents of her son. But she might also be aware of the fact that
he’s a drug dealer, and that she does not want to know more about it. And, as Lynch adds,
suspicions can be stronger or weaker. The mother might strongly suspect her son is a drug
dealer, or only weakly suspect this. What matters on his account is that the suspicion amounts
neither to a belief in the given content nor to a disbelief in it.
In my view, though, we need not add a suspicion or awareness requirement on willful
ignorance. The latter is compatible with suspicions, but there’s also willful ignorance without
them. Hence, my view is more liberal than Lynch’s: it considers the class of willful ignorance
to be larger. In my view, what matters for willful ignorance is not so much a specific attitude of
the agent, but the fact that she is avoiding inconvenient information, though not due to external
barriers (as I put it in §1). But if this is so, both horns of the puzzle are mistaken. Let me
consider each in turn.
Horn (A) suggests that willful ignorance seems incompatible with full unawareness. Contra
(A), I need to show that if S lacks any suspicion and awareness, then it might still be that she is
willfully ignorant in a relevant sense.
First, consider the two applications from §4. I can imagine that there were many slave-
holders who had no suspicion that their slaves were suffering. Clearly, there are many
consumers today who have no suspicion that the products they buy are made in slavery-like
conditions. Yet they can be willfully ignorant. After all, they are avoiding inconvenient
information, and their ignorance is not due to external barriers.
In fact, assuming that only people with suspicions are willfully ignorant has counterintuitive
consequences. Arguably, consumers who care about working conditions are often suspicious
of the products they buy, while consumers who do not care typically lack such suspicions.
Would this mean that only the concerned consumers are willfully ignorant? That’s counterin-
tuitive. After all, the external barriers to obtaining more information about working conditions
are exactly the same for both kinds of consumers.
The same applies to interesting versions of Moody-Adams’ cases. Suppose the mother or
the school administrator lacks any suspicion. The mother might even disbelieve that her son
21 In addition, as Lynch suggests (following Husak and Callender 1994: 40), the attitude must be justified by the
available evidence. You might be very suspicious because you are delusional, but that does not make you
willfully ignorant. In all of Moody-Adams’s cases, if the agents have suspicions, they seem well-supported by the
available evidence.
22 As Moody-Adams suggested to me.
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deals drugs, and the administrator might disbelieve that there is harassment in her school (and I
will assume that these disbeliefs do not go together with suspicions to the contrary). Would that
mean they are not willfully ignorant? Surely not. Their ignorance is still due to their own will
rather than to external barriers, given all the available evidence to the contrary.
If this is right, one may be fully unaware that one is willfully ignorant. Lynch may be right
that in such cases the ignorance is not intended, in a relevant sense. But, it seems to me that not
all willful ignorance is essentially intentional or the upshot of a clear plan. What matters is that
it’s not the upshot of external barriers. If you satisfy (i*)-(v*), then your ignorance is, in the
sense of these conditions, still up to you. Let me defend this from two objections.
First objection: if one has no awareness clause, then one might avoid information for the
wrong reasons, that is, for reasons that have nothing to do with the inconvenience of the
information.
Suppose someone calls you, but you do not know what it is about, and decide not to pick up
the phone because you do not like phone calls (or perhaps you think it’s all-things-considered
better to do something else with your time). Suppose the person calling had inconvenient
information about the permissibility of your behaviour, though you had no idea, and not
picking up the phone had nothing to do with it. Hence, you are avoiding inconvenient
information. You could have picked up the phone (which means that clause (iii) is satisfied),
and on the assumption that you had an obligation to pick up (so that clause (ii) is satisfied as
well), you seem to be willfully ignorant on my account.
In response, I do not think it’s clear that this follows. First, clause (iii) is satisfied only
temporarily, and hence you are not systematically avoiding information. To address this, we
might suppose that they call you each and every day and that you never pick up. Again, we
would not want to call this willful ignorance so long as you are motivated only by your
aversion to phone calls. Still, my account would not consider this a case of willful ignorance
unless there is a causal relationship between your repeated failure to pick up the phone and the
fact that the information is inconvenient for you, and this is unclear in this case.23
Second objection: BWillful ignorance requires some awareness that the ignorance is
convenient. For sometimes we are lucky to have ignorance that meets the other conditions
(i*)-(v*). After ignorance is corrected we might look back and say, BWow, good that I was
ignorant. It was convenient for me.^ But, this shows that the ignorance wasn’t willful.^24 So if
you were unaware that you were avoiding inconvenient truths, then afterwards you might be
glad that this happened to you. And if you are glad in this way, you seem to acknowledge that
you did not really choose to be ignorant.
The objection may seem sensible, but my account can respond to it. Namely, if you fulfil
the inconvenience clause (vi*), then you cannot say BWow, good that I was ignorant^. After
all, the ignorance was convenient, and the information one receives is inconvenient. The
information might reveal that one can no longer do A (forward-looking self-interest), or it
might affect your image (backward-looking self-interest), or it might reveal something about
someone you care about (other-interest). Furthermore, if you cannot be happy that you were
ignorant, you are not committed to acknowledge that you did not really choose to be ignorant,
as the objection has it.
23 I did not offer a further analysis of what this causal relation entails, though it is plausible to assume that this
relation can obtain even when the agent is unaware of it.
24 Quoting Phil Robichaud. We are lucky in such a case, I take it, because our ignorance worked out well for us,
and not because it was exceptional that the conditions were fulfilled (as the first objection had it).
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Horn (B) suggests that willful ignorance seems incompatible with a certain awareness.
Contra (B), I need to show that willful ignorance is not only compatible with a certain
unawareness (as I just argued), but also with various kinds of awareness.
First Case S has a very weak reason to suspect that A is wrong, and decides in full
awareness not to consider further information about A’s wrongness. Suppose you know that
10 % of this company’s products are made in slavery-like conditions, but do not know whether
this specific product is made in such conditions. Despite your weak suspicion that buying it
may be wrong, you decide not to consider further information and just to buy it.25 This seems
to be a clear case of willful ignorance.
Second Case S has a strong reason to suspect that A is wrong, and decides in full
awareness not to consider further information about A’s wrongness. Suppose you know
that 90 % of this company’s products are made in slavery-like conditions, but do not
know whether this specific product is made in such conditions. Despite your strong
suspicion that buying it may be wrong, you decide not to consider further information
and just to buy it. This also seems to be a case of willful ignorance (and the same would
apply to any further variant of these cases26).
Final Case S not only has a strong suspicion that A is wrong, she also believes it. Suppose
you rightly believe that all products are made in slavery-like conditions. Still, this information
is inconvenient for you, and you suppress your belief by masking your consuming behaviour
(just as the torturer masks her violent methods) and by avoiding information which would
bring your belief to the center of your awareness. You are not fully aware that your purchase is
wrong, but you do believe that it is deep down. In such a case, I think you might still be called
willfully ignorant.
All in all, given that on my account willful ignorance is about avoiding inconvenient
information, it does not really matter what attitude the agent has, and willful ignorance is
compatible with awareness and unawareness of various kinds. In my view, the only attitude
incompatible with willful ignorance is full awareness that one is doing something wrong. For if
one is fully aware of this, one is simply not ignorant.27
6 Conclusion
I have offered my analysis of willful ignorance in §3, and in the subsequent sections I have
argued why it need not be supplemented with further conditions. To see the innovative aspects
of my account, it’s helpful to compare it to the account by Lynch (2016), mentioned earlier. On
Lynch’s view, as we have seen, willful ignorance essentially entails a certain attitude, namely a
suspicion that the proposition S is ignorant about is true. I have argued that such suspicions
needn’t be present in all cases.
On both accounts, it’s important that S does not inform herself because she does not want
to. To clarify, Lynch cites the suggestion by Husak & Callender that: Bthe willfully ignorant
25 Surely, sometimes such risk-taking might be justified, namely if S had to act and doing A is all-things-
considered better than waiting for more information.
26 Including the experiment by Dana et al. (2007), where participants know that 50 % of the outcomes are unfair.
27 We do not need to add this to our list of conditions (i*)-(v*). For if S is fully aware that A is wrong, I’d think S
has no obligation to consider the issue further (and clause (ii) would fail).
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defendant must have a given motive for remaining unaware of the truth … His failure to gain
more information cannot be due to mere laziness, stupidity, or the absence of curiosity.^ (1994:
40) Of course, the question is what this motivation might amount to. I have explained this in
terms of my inconvenience clause: S does not consider certain information because this
information is inconvenient for her (in one of the three senses that I have distinguished).
One further difference is that I consider my account only sufficient, not necessary. As
suggested in §1, in principle any case of ignorance where S could know better, but does not
want to know better (such as ignorance about the weather conditions in Amsterdam) seems to
count as willful ignorance. Indeed, one may be willfully ignorant of inconvenient information
as well as other kinds of information (such as irrelevant information).28 At any rate, given that
the latter are less interesting, it’s no problem that my account does not capture such further
cases.29
This brings me to the issue I started with: moral progress. Why is there still so much slavery
in the world? Why do so many consumers today buy products made in unacceptable working
conditions? As said, Moody-Adams suggests that willful ignorance is the main obstacle to
moral progress. Recently, Pleasants (2011) has criticized this claim by arguing that it is
implausible that people could have remained willfully ignorant about slavery for so long.
According to Pleasants, it’s more plausible to think that they could not have known better since
no plausible alternative to such a useful institutionalized practice was available to them. The
disagreement between Moody-Adams and Pleasants involves an intricate issue about the
relation between individuals and cultures, which is something I cannot delve into here. Let
me just make two points concerning why one may want to resist Pleasants’ criticism.
First, I acknowledge that a lack of plausible alternatives to useful institutionalized practices
might hinder moral progress as well. Still, it is unclear that slaveholders were forced to keep
slaves, or that most consumers are forced to buy cheap products made in unacceptable
conditions. In these cases (as well as in the four further cases by Moody-Adams I have
discussed), plausible alternatives seem to me the default situation. If this is right, moreover, the
explanation of why there’s so little moral progress has to be sought elsewhere.
Second, the claim that it is implausible that people could have stayed willfully ignorant for so
long underestimates the force of willful ignorance.What obstructs moral progress, it seems to me, is
willful ignorance motivated by what I have called ‘backward-looking’ and ‘forward-looking self-
interest’. We do not want to consider whether our practices are wrong, first because we have
engaged in them for too long, and realizing this will seriously affect the image we have of ourselves.
Second, we do not want to consider it, because it’s in our interests if we stay ignorant: slaveholders
want to keep their cheap workers, and consumers wants to keep on buying cheap clothes.
While I do not take these brief comments to be at all decisive, I do hope theywill provoke further
debate. The next and important question is whether we are responsible and indeed blameworthy for
our willful ignorance. Is it the case that if our ignorance is willful, it is blameworthy and does not
excuse us from wrongdoing? This is a complex question, to be addressed some other time. At least
now we have a novel proposal on the table concerning what willful ignorance amounts to.
28 According to Lynch (2016: 511-2), ignorance about the weather conditions does not count as willful, because
‘willful’ has a pejorative tone which is missing here.
29 Our accounts coincide on other points. One comment on Lynch’s requirement that p has to be true (for without
truth, there’s nothing to be ignorant about). Typically, this clause is entailed by the clause that S should consider p
(if p is false, S does not have an obligation to consider p), and the latter is included in my account. Still, one may
wonder whether the clause is really needed given that one may willfully avoid inconvenient information about a
false proposition.
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